Australian efforts switched to reconstruction in November 2002 and Special forces were withdrawn as the focus switched to Iraq in 2003. But the war against Saddam hid the fact the Taliban had not been eliminated and the Iraqi distraction was a huge boost to their morale. A second group called the Pakistani Taliban– unaffiliated with the Afghan version – were becoming increasingly important and operated with impunity on their side of a lawless border.
According to the ADF’s 2009 white paper Force 2030, success in Afghanistan is dependent on ensuring “the local population is protected and separated from the insurgents, economic and social reconstruction occurs, indigenous security capacity is strengthened, insurgent networks are disrupted and the prospects for a long-term political solution are enhanced.” It foresaw significant international support for 10 years. Afghanistan was unstable because of its “potential” as a terrorist base and also because of its narcotics trade. The paper acknowledged a solution would need to address “insurgent safe-havens located in Pakistan, and there will need to be found a comprehensive solution to the problems of cross-border movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan by al-Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents.”
As the Afpak situation became increasingly murky, public unease grew. Neither major party could clearly articulate a vision for Australian action in the region beyond “defeating international terrorism”. The ALP policy on Afghanistan is buried in a “Labor Plan for Defence” fact sheet: “Federal Labor has maintained Australia’s commitment to the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, in recognition of the fundamental importance to Australia’s security interests that terrorists be denied a safe haven in that country.”
According to the policy, the Gillard Government will not keep Australian troops in Afghanistan “any longer than necessary”. But Labor remains committed to troops as long as required. Neither the withdrawal nor the commitment have objectives or critical success factors. The policy says Defence expects to complete the Uruzgan training, transition security responsibility and move into a supporting role “within two to four years”.
Liberal policy on Afghanistan is harder to find. It doesn’t appear in either its Foreign Affairs or Defence policies. The only references to Afghanistan on the Liberal Party website are in press releases such as the latest death which says Australian troops are in Afghanistan “fighting in defence of our values of liberty and democracy, wearing our uniform, serving under our flag, against the world’s most dangerous enemy.”
The last policy statement was in April 2009 which supported the Labor deployment of additional troops. Shadow Minister for Defence Senator David Johnston said boosting troop numbers “sent the right message to our allies that we are in for the long haul in terms of rebuilding Afghanistan so it was no longer a safe-haven and training ground for terrorists.” Senator Johnston said Australians should never forget the Bali bombing terrorists were trained in Afghanistan. “It is dangerous to be there but it is even more dangerous for us not to be,” he said.
The link between the Bali bombers and Afghanistan is disingenuous. Indonesian police said bombing “field commander” Imam Samudra went to Afghanistan in 1991 and learned to make bombs there. The attack’s overall co-ordinator Mukhlas also worked with the mujahidin in the 1990s as did fellow planner Ali Imron. However they were all there before the Taliban seized power. The mujahidin were supported by the West who wanted to overthrow the Communist Najibullah regime. Although they succeeded in 1992, war continued throughout the mid 1990s as mujahidin fought each other for control of Kabul. Pakistan-backed Mullah Omar took control with his Taliban forces in 1996.
The terrorists had training there not because it was a “haven” but simply because it is a war-torn country where law and order has little standing. The long war is undermining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ability to function as democratic states. In his acceptance speech today for the Sydney Peace Prize, Noam Chomsky said no-one wanted Afghanistan to be run by the Taliban or the US-backed warlords. “There are very significant Afghan peace forces, pro-democracy forces, but if you check with them, they regularly regard themselves as facing three enemies: the Taliban, the US-backed warlords, and NATO forces.” In a world where politicians and media prefer to keep messages black and white, there are too many shades of gray in this Afghanistan war.