Across Ireland this year, there are 100 year commemorations to mark the two states formed at the end of the Irish War of Independence. Ireland was partitioned in 1921 and its border was set in stone in the coming years. Though largely rendered invisible in recent years, Brexit threatens to make the border real again. The border was a response of British imperial statecraft to an intractable religious conflict, so it was unsurprising the British would look to that solution when faced with an even bigger problem 25 years later between India and Pakistan, “the conjoined twins cursed at birth”.
Though I loved Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie’s account of that partition, I knew little else about it. Nor did I know much about the partition much closer to home. I was born in the south of the Republic of Ireland in the 1960s and Northern Ireland was strange and forbidding and mostly remote place with little to do my upbringing. Five hours away by road and light years away by attitude, Waterford was immune to the violence though I remember the black flags of grim-faced IRA Hunger Striker protesters in 1981. As the troubles worsened in the early 1970s and occasionally spilled over the border as it did with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 I took my grandmother’s dim view of the North. She wished a giant scissors would cut the two Irelands apart and send the North drifting off towards Scotland. It wasn’t until 1984 when I took a day trip to Belfast by train that the place became real to me and strikingly Irish, at that. That feeling has grown in recent years since the Good Friday agreement and I was surprised by the complete absence of the border when I drove across it in 2000 – the only clue was road signs changing from kilometers to miles. With the intractable Brexit issue and the growing Catholic population, perhaps a federal Ireland with power bases in Dublin and Belfast might be the long term future for the island.
I wondered whether federal power-sharing arrangement could possibly work for India and Pakistan given their cultural resemblances to each other despite a similar religious divide to Ireland. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh’s The Partition of India (2009) said the 1947 Partition not only created the states of India and Pakistan but also split two provinces along Muslim and Hindu lines – Punjab in the west and Bengal in the east. As in Ulster, this was not just a colonial whim – a local majority carved out states that best suited them. Though the British also used this solution in Palestine around the same time, Talbot and Singh say they were reluctant to split India and only did so to avoid civil war.
The ethnic cleansing experience of partition does not solve problems, as Palestine’s resulting tragedy shows. In Ireland more than 500 were killed in the violence following partition and 10,000 became refugees, most from the Catholic minority. The death toll in India’s partition is much larger but disputed, anything from 200,000 to two million deaths. Fifteen million people moved in the largest displacement of the 20th century while Kashmir remains unfinished business for both states. Germany aside, partitions have been rarely reversed. India and Pakistan’s enmity is exacerbated by nuclear weapons, a problem shared by another partitioned Asian state: Korea.
At the end of World War II, India remained under colonial rule but it was only a matter of timing when that would end. Labour’s win in the UK 1945 election was helpful as they had good relations with India’s Congress Party. Congress was established in 1885 as the secular voice of all India. But the growing power of the Muslim League needed to be accommodated with its demand for a separate Pakistan. The empire endgame began with the Great Calcutta Killing in August 1946 climaxing in genocidal violence a year later as India descended into religious civil war. On June 3, 1947 Britain agreed to transfer power to two dominions, India and the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Bengal, Baluchistan and the NWFP). The British departure on August 15 left demarcation disputes and large-scale disturbances in the Punjab which resulted in large-scale migration on religious lines. The trouble in Bengal was slower to erupt but its migration lasted well into the 1950s.
Ireland’s Protestant population was also greatest in the North East but imagine what might have happened had Cork in the South West also had a Protestant majority. A Cork-Ulster alliance would have been inherently unstable. This is what happened in India, leading to a second partition of Bangladesh in the 1970s. Yet while Muslims had majorities in north-west and north-east India, the push for the first Partition came from the United Provinces where they numbered eight million, 15pc of the population, centred on Lucknow.
Here the Urdu-speaking landed gentry stood to lose most from a Hindu-dominated India. Most agricultural labourers did not have time to care about governance but Muslim separatism grew because the colonial state had categorised India by caste and religious identity since the census introduced in 1881. This led to separate provincial electorates for Muslims in 1909. In 1928 Muhammad Ali Jinnah proposed his fourteen points to safeguard Muslim rights in a self-governing India. His emphasis on strong provinces in a weak federation largely reflected the Punjabi dominated All-India Muslim Conference. Chaudary Rahmat Ali coined the term Pakistan in 1933 as “the land of the pure” consisting of Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan though he was ignored at the time.
Two factors brought Pakistan to the centre of the agenda. First was the lived experience of Congress rule after provincial autonomy in 1937; the second was the world war. Jinnah exploited both adroitly. In the 1937 election the Muslim League was eclipsed by regional parties in Punjab and Bengal but did well in Muslim minority provinces positioning itself as the safeguard of Muslim rights. Congress ruled seven of 11 provinces and ignored Muslim interests instead enforcing cow protection and the use of Hindi, just as the new Protestant state in Northern Ireland ignored Catholic demands. Indian Muslims exaggerated claims of oppression and gained wider support as a result. By 1940 they were calling for “independent states in which the constituent units would be autonomous and sovereign” in north-west and north-east India.
The British ignored their calls. When war arrived, Congress used it to advance their cause with the Non Cooperation (1939-42) and Quit India movements (1942) leading to violence. The Irish Free State, led by Éamon de Valera, also refused to cooperate with the Allies but two decades of de facto independence meant the British could only quietly fume at his decision. India was still British-controlled so they could and did arrest Congress leaders including Jawahartal Nehru. This left a vacuum for the Muslim League. The British saw Jinnah as a wartime equal to Gandhi (whom they dared not arrest) implicitly accepting the League’s claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims. The 1942 Stafford Cripps Mission had a proviso that no part of India would have to join the post-war dominion. This pleased Jinnah but an enraged Gandhi thought it was an invite to create Pakistan. After an impasse, the British called the 1945 Simla conference which collapsed when Jinnah insisted all Muslim members of the proposed Indian Executive Council should be members of his League.
Jinnah got his way scuttling any chance of unionist Muslims on the council. In the 1946 provincial elections they won 75 of the 86 Muslim seats. This was similar to Irish election results in 1918 and 1921 where hardliners on both sides strengthened positions against moderates. Jinnah’s influence with Britain diminished after the war yet Congress began to see partition as a heavy but necessary price of independence. They wanted the border set on their terms, similar to the Irish aims around the 1921 Peace Treaty. They believed partition would offer a peaceful solution to the violence that wracked India in 1946-47. In March 1947 Congress called for a splitting of Punjab if Pakistan was created. They were also pacified that Bengal’s largest city Calcutta was on their side of the border. Congress leader Nehru saw the Muslim League as hindering post-independence economic development. Britain gradually accepted partition but did not want complete Balkanisation – Sikhs, Pashtuns, Tamils and others wanting their own states would not be tolerated. The British tried a last ditch 1946 effort to impose an All-India solution with limited powers for the central government which the Muslim League cautiously supported. But when Nehru baulked at the three provincial groupings, the League withdrew support and an united India was dead. Both powers wanted a “right-sized state” to shape their own destiny. Jinnah reluctantly agreed to the sub-partition of Punjab and Bengal.
As in Ireland, a British-led Boundary Commission was a chaotic failure with local powerbrokers destroying attempts at diplomacy. When the British recommended joint sharing of Punjab’s intricate canal works, Jinnah said he’d prefer “Pakistan deserts than fertile fields watered by the courtesy of the Hindus”. Media rumours of the border position lay fuelled violence in the lead-up to partition and the Commission delayed announcing some Muslim-majority areas of Punjab would be awarded to India. A Punjab Boundary Force was no match for local warlords who took what the Commission denied them. Bengal’s partition was less acrimonious with both sides content to lobby for power post-partition, though the loss of 21 million people diminished Bengal’s voice in India. Some Bengal Muslims preferred their own sovereign state. Conflict between Bengali and Urdu Pakistan elites dominated east-west relations eventually leading to the second partition of 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh.
There were other complications. The largest princely state was Hyderabad, ruled by a Muslim nizam with an 85 percent Hindu population. The nizam favoured Pakistan but was landlocked by India and the problem had not been resolved by August 1947. India invaded Hyderabad as a “police action” in September 1948 while Pakistan was distracted by mourning after the death of founder Jinnah. That left Kashmir as the biggest sore. The 1846 Treaty of Lahore ended Sikh domination and handed power to a Hindu elite for a century, with the majority Muslim population reduced to a servile peasantry. Sheikh Abdullah called for Kashmiri independence but was imprisoned for two decades. Powerbrokers voted with India which resulted in hostilities between the two new states, UN intervention, and de facto division along the ceasefire line. Kashmir remains the unfinished business of partition.
Just as in Ireland, the Indian division of power was accompanied by massive dislocation. Communal violence had one major aim – to remove troublesome minority populations. A million people died with both sides happy to blame the other while authorities implicitly supported the violence. Women and children were deliberately targetted with police, soldiers and railway staff often divulging details of refugee trains to violent groups. Many women were killed by their own family, fearful of their “defilement” by men from the other side. Suicide, such as the death of 105 Sikh women who jumped into a village well, was considered an honourable response and the subject of community pride.
Indian partition was accompanied by the largest uprooting of people in the 20th century. In Punjab ten million people moved in either direction. Karachi tripled in size between 1947 and 1953. Many travelled to multiple places before finding a new home. The flight started later in Bengal, reaching a peak of 1.5 million in 1949. Calcutta’s population rose by 20 percent in five years and there was a further flight in 1971. By 1973 the city housed two million refugees, a third of West Bengal’s urban population. The migrations left an enduring legacy of religious and ethnic nationalism that still plagues the region.
Ireland is 25 years further along the partition journey. There is still much hatred in Ireland but a great deal of political civility. More importantly there is a will on the ground to treat with the other. Perhaps some Diwali or Ramadan Peace Agreement could get India and Pakistan to pull away from each other’s throat. That requires political leadership that does not appear to exist in either country, where it is too easy to don the nationalist mantle. It seems hard to imagine their borders ever disappearing. But if India is to realise its ambition to become a 21st century power in the mould of America, it must face up to demons on its own border and confront the reality of its lookalike neighbour.
There is a template for this. India has friendly relations with East Pakistan’s successor nation, Bangladesh, and they are the largest trade partners in South Asia. Inter-Irish trade is the main reason Northern Ireland is still in the EU Single Market. Trade, and perhaps the cricket beloved by both nations (though sadly not Ireland), may yet be the solution to the South Asian nuclear standoff.